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 Abstract 
The article seeks to analyse whether a Europeanisation of national parties has taken place 
amongst the EU-newcomers of 1995 – Austria, Finland and Sweden – studying Euro-
manifestos. Europeanisation is measured based on two characteristics: first, salience a party 
attributes to the European level and second, policy positions a party holds towards European 
issues. Moreover, we assume that Europeanisation may result in an impact on the traditional 
national cleavage lines changing the dominant Left-Right dimension. Our results show that 
Europeanisation in terms of salience has indeed taken place; Europeanisation in terms of 
policy position change, however, could only be observed in Sweden and Austria. Regarding 
the cleavage structure, we noticed a reinforcement of the Left-Right divide by the European 
issue in Sweden and in Finland, while in Austria a new cleavage line could be identified: 
Green/Alternative/Libertarian versus Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalism. The Europeanisa-
tion process has therefore progressed most strongly in Austria. Overall, we conclude that the 
European integration process does have an influence on national political parties. 
Zusammenfassung 
Anhand einer Analyse von Parteiprogrammen untersucht der Artikel die Frage, ob eine 
Europäisierung nationaler Parteien innerhalb der EU-Neumitgliedsstaaten von 1995 – 
Österreich, Finnland und Schweden – stattgefunden hat. Europäisierung lässt sich anhand 
von zwei Charakteristika beurteilen: erstens anhand der Bedeutung (Salienz), welche eine 
Partei der europäischen Ebene beimisst, zweitens anhand der Policy-Positionen, die eine 
Partei bezüglich europäischer Themen einnimmt. Wir nehmen darüber hinaus an, dass 
Europäisierung zu einer Veränderung der traditionellen nationalen Konfliktlinien (Cleavages) 
führen kann, durch die sich die dominante Rechts-Links-Dimension verändert. Unsere 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Europäisierung bezüglich der Salienz in allen drei Staaten 
stattgefunden hat, bezüglich der Policy-Positionen jedoch lediglich in Schweden und 
Österreich. Hinsichtlich der Veränderung von Cleavage-Strukturen verzeichnen wir eine 
Stärkung der Rechts-Links-Kluft durch das Thema Europa in Schweden und in Finnland, 
während in Österreich eine neue Konfliktlinie identifiziert werden konnte: 
Grün/Alternativ/Libertär versus Traditionalistisch/Autoritär/Nationalistisch. Der 
Europäisierungsprozess ist also in Österreich am stärksten fortgeschritten. Insgesamt ist 
unsere Schlussfolgerung, dass der europäische Integrationsprozess tatsächlich einen 
Einfluss auf nationale politische Parteien ausübt. 
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Introduction 
The Europeanisation of parties within the EU member states has become a topic of 
increasing interest to scholars of European politics. Previous studies looked at the 
Europeanisation processes of European Union public policies (Cowles et al., 2001; Börzel 
and Risse, 2003) or at the change of party structures within the European political space (Hix 
and Lord, 1997; Gabel and Hix, 2002). Only recently has more research been directed at the 
Europeanisation processes affecting national parties (e.g. Mair, 2000; Binnema, 2003; 
Ladrech, 2002; Kritzinger, et al. 2004) where two perspectives prevail. The first perspective 
is the bottom-up one focussing on Europeanisation of parties at the EU-level. The 
conclusions that have been drawn so far are that a European party system is unlikely to 
emerge because parties continue to focus on national issues and thereby do not allow their 
European-level counterparts to gain in importance (Andeweg, 1995; Mair, 2000). The second 
perspective takes up a top-down approach. It stresses that the issue of Europe is playing an 
increasing role in national party positions – Europe has enlarged their scope of action and 
the range of issues they have to address (Kohler-Koch, 1999; see also Mair, 2000). In 
addition, the European dimension has become part of their positioning on domestic issues 
(Radaelli, 2000). 
This article seeks to add to this research and aims to answer the question whether Europe 
changes national parties and their positions. In other words: is a Europeanisation of national 
parties taking place? 
We adopt the widely accepted definition of Robert Ladrech (1994) of Europeanisation as a 
process of reorientation. According to Ladrech, Europeanisation is “an incremental process 
re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic 
dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” 
(Ladrech, 1994: 69).1 A crucial aspect of re-orienting positions with regard to Europe is the 
development of Euro-phobia and Euro-scepticism at the nation state level. Europeanisation 
in terms of reorientation grasps a change in policy positions within parties, with which a 
distinctiveness of parties on the EU-issue is achieved. We therefore complement Ladrech’s 
definition with the salience a party attributes to the European issue as a characteristic of 
Europeanisation of political parties. Salience is a measure to grasp an increased occupation 
of national parties with the issue of Europe and an increased importance attached to it (e.g. 
Pennings and Keman, 2002). Hence, Europeanisation is taking place when changes in the 
                                                     
1  For strong criticism of using the term ‘Europeanisation’ in such a way, see Binnema (2003). The definition 
would cover the broad range of literature that has developed on the emergence of European parties at EU 
level (see Hix and Lord, 1997). However, our interest concentrates on the effects European integration has on 
parties on the national level. 
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positioning of parties towards Europe are detectable over time and the issue of Europe gains 
in importance within national political parties.2  
Higher salience and position changes resulting in attempts to distinguish each other from the 
political competitors over the European issue may result in an impact on the traditional 
national cleavage lines – some scholars have argued that an impact of the issue Europe is 
visible that results in a change of the dominant Left-Right dimension (e.g. Hix and Lord, 
1997; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002).  
Based on this definition of Europeanisation this article highlights three points.  
First, we examine if the issue of Europe has become more important over time. If salience of 
the European issue increases, parties apparently take Europe seriously and accept it as an 
important element of their positioning. Salience would then be a factor which indicates 
Europeanisation. 
Second, we ask whether parties change their positions towards Europe, and whether parties 
disagree upon the European issue. Our assumption is that only in party systems that are 
divided over policy stances on Europe do these policy positions actually play a major role in 
electoral campaigns and are hence worth changing in order to distinguish the party from its 
competitors. We anticipate that whenever parties have to position themselves less strongly in 
relation to European integration, no changes in party positions along the lines of anti- or pro-
European positions can be found. Hence, it is less likely that a Europeanisation in terms of 
position change has taken place. We will operationalise our measurement of change in 
national party positions by analysing pro- and anti-European positions of parties. Position 
change and distinctiveness amongst parties is hence another factor which indicates 
Europeanisation.  
Third, we relate our findings on the degree of Europeanisation to previous research on the 
role of cleavages in parties’ positions towards Europe (see Hix and Lord, 1997; Hooghe et 
al., 2002). We investigate how parties use Europe in their (electoral) strategy and hence, 
how the issue of Europe relates to the predominant Left-Right divide. Since voters vote along 
cleavage lines – in particular, along the Left-Right divide – party systems should be 
structured accordingly. However, as European integration could challenge the existing 
dominance of the Left-Right dimension, a new important electoral channel might have 
opened up (Bartolini, 1999).  
                                                     
2  Europeanisation is expressed through an increase in the expression of parties connected to the European 
level as well as through changes with respect to the pro- and anti-Europeanness of party positions.  
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Through the empirical analysis based on data from the Euro-manifesto group in Mannheim 
who coded Euro-manifestos of parties released for the European Parliament elections, we 
seek to transcend the empirical insufficiencies in the literature on the Europeanisation 
process of national political parties. Next to this dataset, we further use the expert survey 
conducted by Steenbergen et al. (2004) as well as some data from the Eurobarometer-
surveys.  
We restrict our analysis to the three European member states that joined the EU in 1995: 
Austria, Finland and Sweden. Party manifestos on the EP-elections in 1995/96 and 1999 
have been used for the analysis. The selection of these states has three reasons. Firstly, due 
to the joint accession to the EU in 1995, the parties of all three states should feature 
approximately the same degree of (non-) Europeanisation. Secondly, the 1995 accession 
states have been largely neglected in the literature. Finally, we expect that parties’ 
disagreement on the European integration process could enhance the Europeanisation 
process and could thus help to open up a new cleavage amongst parties. In Austria and 
Sweden, we face quite anti-European parties that receive a substantial amount of votes in 
elections. As in Finland anti-European parties do not show lots of support in terms of 
percentage of votes, we anticipate that parties have to position themselves less strongly in 
relation to European integration and hence, no changes in party positions along the lines of 
anti- or pro-European positions can be found. This relates to our already mentioned 
assumption that only in party systems that are divided over stances in Europe are policy 
positions worth changing in order to distinguish the party from its competitors. 
We commence with an overview over general party positions in the three selected countries. 
In section 3 we introduce the data used. Then, we present our analysis of salience. Next, we 
look at party position change and the cohesiveness of party systems and single parties on 
the issue of Europe compared to voters’ positions on the basis of Eurobarometer data. In 
section 5, we examine cleavage lines in connection with the issue of Europe. Finally, in the 
conclusions we sum up our results with an outlook on future research. 
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1. The 1995 EU-Newcomers 
A brief overview over the party systems of the three states should clarify the assumptions 
outlined in the introduction. Moreover, it should help in better understanding the results in the 
following analyses.  
The Swedish party system consists of a right bloc with Moderates (MSP), Liberals (FP), the 
Christian Democrats (KD) and the Center Party (CP) with largely pro-European positions. 
The MSP and the FP are clearly pro-European parties, whereas the CP and the KD are less 
decisive in their view of Europe (Jahn and Widfeldt, 1996). The party who dominated 
Swedish politics for the longest time is part of the left bloc - the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party (SAP). The SAP takes a pro-European stand and is considered to have positions close 
to those of the MSP and the FP with regard to environmental issues. Its EU positions stand 
in contrast to strongly leftist parties such as the formerly communist Left Party (VP) or the 
Greens (MPG), who stand for an anti-European position. Overall, the moderate parties of 
both blocs – MSP, FP, SAP, CP and KD – are positive about the EU membership. However, 
large intra-party tensions have been indicated within the SAP, the CP and the KD: the 
majority of their respective supporters have a negative attitude towards the European Union. 
The EU-negative parties have no problems maintaining their grassroots support: the MPG 
and the VP are “virtually unified from top to grass roots” (Jahn and Widfeldt, 1996: 420). In 
terms of cleavages structure, it is argued that Sweden changed from the dominant Left-Right 
divide to a cleavage between ecology and growth or technology – a development that has 
been taken up, for instance, by Hooghe et al. (2002), who observe a development towards 
Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) and Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalism (TAN). 
However, scholars also observe that the EU as an issue of politics revitalises the Left-Right 
dimension (Jahn and Widfeldt, 1996: 419). 
Austria’s party system was essentially characterised by a continuous governing coalition of 
the socialist Social Democrat Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the conservative Austrian Peoples’ 
Party (ÖVP) since the mid-1980s. A largely corporatist culture supported the grand coalition. 
The Greens, the Communists and the Liberals did not account for a powerful opposition. In 
the mid-1980s, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) took a turn from a liberal to a populist 
right-wing party, gained substantial votes and thus gained government power in a coalition 
with the ÖVP (Fallend, 2002). This coalition even led to EU sanctions against Austria. The 
FPÖ has largely lost a lot of its power but remains an important actor in the Austrian political 
system. Also in 1986, the Green-Alternatives entered into the national parliament as a new 
party in the Austrian political system and helped to shake up the closed negotiation culture 
maintained by the SPÖ and the ÖVP. The right-wing FPÖ and the left-wing Green party were 
the only parties with anti-EU positions. The FPÖ had been largely in favour of the EU until 
1991/1992 but then changed with a new national strategy adopted by its party chairman Jörg 
Haider, which turned against European integration. Due to this turn, the pro-European liberal 
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party (LIF) emerged. It split from the FPÖ in 1993 because the liberal members of the 
Freedom party did not share the anti-European position (Fallend, 2002). The SPÖ and the 
ÖVP maintain pro-EU positions. The Austrian population, however, is largely unsatisfied with 
Austria’s EU membership and largely believes that the EU membership has harmed Austria 
more than its citizens have benefited. Overall, Austria’s party positions are strongly linked to 
the Left-Right dimension. 
Finland’s party system is largely moderate in its character – no extreme right exists. 
Moderate right parties are the National Coalition (KOK), the Swedish People’s Party 
(RKP/SFP), the Centre Party (KESK), and the Christian Union (KD), and the left bloc 
consists of the moderate Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Left Wing League (VAS). 
Further parties are the Green League (VIHP) and, of less importance, the True Finns – who 
emerged out of the Rural Party. Both parties are largely supported in rural areas. As in 
Sweden, pro-European positions are taken by most of the moderate parties of both the left 
and right. These are, in the case of Finland, the SDP, the KOK and the RKP/SFP. The VIHP, 
the KD, the VAS and the agrarian KESK stand for anti-European positions (Taggart, 1998). 
Significant cleavages are the Left-Right divide and a divide between national and 
international perspectives and interests (Raunio and Wiberg, 2001).  
To sum up, the landscape of political parties in Sweden, Finland and Austria can best be 
sketched along the lines of the Left-Right divide and in Sweden along the development of the 
so-called ‘new politics’ dimension or, in a narrower sense, an environmentalist dimension. 
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2. Data  
Analyses on party positions on European integration have been mainly carried out first, 
relating to results of expert surveys (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2002), second, 
focussing on data from the ‘Comparative Manifesto Group’ which handle national manifesto 
data (e.g. Pennings, 2002), or third, based on the coding of manifestos of the party groups of 
the European Parliament (EP) (e.g. Gabel and Hix, 2002). However, none of the analyses so 
far have used the manifestos of national parties that have been created especially for the 
EP-elections. The Euro-manifesto group in Mannheim has created a dataset that focuses on 
these special manifestos released in the lead up to the European election. The coding 
scheme is similar to the one of the Comparative Manifesto Group: sixty-nine categories at 
political levels in seven policy domains (Wüst and Volkens, 2003). As these documents focus 
on a specific European event – European Parliament elections – we believe that processes 
of party Europeanisation can be better traced than in documents focussing on national 
elections. 
To use party manifestos as a dataset is common practice (e.g. Ray, 2003; Hooghe and 
Marks, 1999; Kritzinger et al. 2004; Binder and Wüst, 2004). In our case, the intention is to 
derive the Europeanisation of parties from the extent to which their treatment of the 
European factor has gained in salience, and has led to more divergence between party 
positions. For this intention, the analysis of party programmes appears satisfying because 
parties will communicate their standpoints concerning Europe in the party programmes.3 
Despite the criticism that party programmes are only read by a minority of politically 
interested voters, it can be argued that party programmes contain the central ideas the 
parties stand for, and that the core contents of party programmes are communicated in other 
ways as well. Hence, they reach the citizens indirectly and can therefore be used to interpret 
a party’s character as well as its change from election to election (Binder and Wüst, 2004).  
                                                     
3  A criticism that could emerge concerns the ability of party programmes to actually display the party’s 
standpoints in the individual countries selected for analysis. For the case of Finland, Raunio and Wiberg 
maintain that party programmes and individual campaigns can largely differ, and that European integration 
issues were of little importance in debates – in particular for the two European elections we chose to analyse: 
“While parties issued rather detailed election manifestos or European programmes, individual candidates 
where free to conduct their own campaigns. There was hardly any pressure from the party leadership to force 
the candidates to follow the agreed party line […]” (Raunio and Wiberg, 2001: 18). However, our goal is to 
analyse internal changes of parties’ occupation with Europe. Raunio and Widberg’s argument would therefore 
even support the analysis of party manifestos. What we cannot do with this data is to take the internal 
conflicts over Europe into account. We can only measure the overall Europeanisation of the parties and have 
to leave the analysis of the Europeanisation of individual party members or factions to another study. 
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For this study we have used the Euro-manifestos from 1995 for Swedish parties and from 
1996 for Austrian and Finish parties.4 The EP-elections took place in different years. Next to 
this first set of data we also used Euro-manifesto data from 1999. 
As Europeanisation will change the relation between parties, we expect parties to have 
different positions on European policies and institutions, but also on the transfer of decision-
making processes, and on the opportunities and constraints that European integration holds 
for the single parties (Binnema, 2004). Thus, it might not be enough to analyse only whether 
parties have generally become more pro-European or vice versa, but we have to go more 
into detail. Therefore, we have created different issue categories from our dataset that gather 
these more detailed positions as well: ‘EU-Institution’ to gather parties positions towards EU-
institutions, ‘EU-Democracy’ to grasp whether democracy at the EU-level is regarded as 
sufficient, ‘EU-Policies’ to analyse parties’ positions towards the different policies handled at 
the European level, and finally, ‘EU-Competence’ to study the degree to which parties allow 
the transfer of decision-making (see Appendix).  
In the next step, we use Eurobarometer-survey data in order to establish the connection 
between voters’ EU-positions and the ones parties hold. Finally, the expert survey regarding 
the Left-Right dimension of party systems from Steenbergen et al. (2004) is used to analyse 
whether parties behaved according to the Left-Right dimension when focussing on European 
issues. In the next sections we will present our results.   
 
                                                     
4  We are aware of the limits of this method. A stricter test could be carried out with an additional look at national 
party manifestos. Such an approach would go beyond the scope of an article, however. 
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3. Europeanisation through Salience? 
In order to analyse whether a Europeanisation process has taken place amongst parties, we 
observe the salience parties give to the European issue and whether this salience has 
changed over time. The question that drives us is how much attention parties attribute to 
Europe. We start with the assumption that if national parties take up the European issue as 
one of their topics, this can be characterised as a Europeanisation process. 
Why should we care about the salience parties attach to the issue of Europe? First, previous 
research suggests that national parties react to an increasing importance of the European 
level by incorporating this issue in their national programmes and the party discourse (Ray, 
2003). Parties will attribute most attention to issues with which they can gain votes, while 
neglecting those which could harm them. Salience is thus an indicator of the importance 
parties attribute to an issue. Second, it is generally believed that European elections are 
second order elections (Hix and Lord, 1997; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; 
Reif, 1997) where parties compete over national issues rather than European ones. Hence, 
an increase in salience towards the EU might also be interpreted as an indication that 
European elections are taken more seriously by political parties. Higher salience can hence 
be interpreted as an increase of the European dimension in the respective party’s political 
behaviour.  
We examine Europeanisation in terms of salience through issue-saliency, which is the 
frequency a topic is mentioned. The Euro-manifesto dataset has included variables that 
count sentences referring to the national level, sentences referring to the European level and 
finally those referring to the global level. The following graphs show how parties related to 
the different levels creating quite a surprise as they oppose the general belief about the 
national bias of European elections. 
As we can see from Graph 1, in 1996, in Austria parties refer between 70 and 85 % of their 
counted sentences to the European level, with the exception of the FPÖ, which has only 50 
% and is much more strongly oriented towards the national level. The same pattern can be 
observed in Sweden with the exception of the VP that also features a national bias (see 
Graph 3). Hence, it seems as if some of the known Euro-sceptical parties do use the 
European elections to ‘verbalise’ criticism, which is focused on and deals with the national 
level. This argument can however not be generalised as in both countries the Greens have a 
clear European focus but still are judged as having anti-European positions. In Finland, 
parties have a clear European focus in their manifestos with the KOK even reaching 95 % of 
sentences related to the issue of ‘Europe’, as we can see from Graph 2. The global level is 
attributed very little salience from all parties across all countries.  
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Graph 1: Party Salience – Austria 1996 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
GR SPÖ FPÖ LF ÖVP
World
Europe
National
 
Graph 2: Party Salience – Finland 1996 
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Graph 3: Party Salience – Sweden 1996 
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Does salience change over time? We can observe from Graph 4 to 6 that the European topic 
remains a very salient issue in parties’ Euro-manifestos of 1999. In Sweden the salience of 
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Europe has even increased and the references to the national level have decreased, as we 
can see from the salience the VP attributes to the EU. In Austria, salience has remained 
stable; no major changes can be detected. Only the Greens show more references to the 
global level. Also in Finland, no changes to 1996 can be noticed. However, we would like to 
highlight the KD, who – even though being anti-European – attributes a large degree of 
salience to the European level.  
Graph 4: Party Salience – Austria 1999 
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Graph 5: Party Salience – Finland 1999 
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Graph 6: Party Salience – Sweden 1999 
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Based on this data we can deduce two conclusions. First, parties clearly focus on the 
European issue in their Euro-manifestos and thus, feature a high degree of salience of the 
European level.5 Moreover, European elections are not ‘abused’ to sell national issues but 
clearly focus on the topic the elections are about. A Europeanisation in terms of salience has 
clearly taken place. Second, amongst the Euro-sceptical parties we can deduce two different 
kinds of parties: the first one focuses in its manifestos on the national level, hence, using the 
national level for its Euro-sceptical position. The second one, however, has a clear European 
focus and hence ‘derives’ its Euro-scepticism from European issues. This is another 
indication that Europe is taken seriously and treated as an important factor by political 
parties.   
 
 
                                                     
5  Kritzinger et al. (2004) have shown that also Italian parties feature higher European salience in their Euro-
manifestos which indicates that this might be a general trend across EU member states. However, systematic 
comparison over all European countries has not yet been made.  
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4. Europeanisation through Party Position Change? 
Do parties find it necessary to change their party positions towards European integration or 
do they rather remain static ‘European actors’? And does the European issue present a 
dimension parties disagree upon? The question that drives us is how parties relate to 
Europe: positively or negatively? We are interested in measuring the influence the EU has 
on parties’ positions.  
As the European issue gained in salience it might have also experienced an influence on 
parties’ positions. Parties have a new level to cope with and hence, have to express 
positions towards it. Taggart, for instance, demonstrated that Euro-scepticism appears to be 
an instrument of differentiation for peripheral parties (such as the extreme right or left) in a 
political system from the more established parties (Taggart, 1998). Hence, Europe as a new 
issue and possibly an issue of party differentiation can force parties to expose their positions 
towards European integration more clearly. This could lead to changes in positions that in 
the past have been expressed quite superficially. Changes are interpreted as indications that 
parties are shaping their EU-positions.  
The European level might also represent a new level parties can compete on and show their 
distinctiveness to the other competitors. Parties have to take on an ‘identity’ over the 
European issue. Distinctiveness from other parties helps creating this identity. Mair 
describes it as a change in “[…] the mechanics of party systems” (2000: 30) referring to a 
changed interaction of parties in the electoral arena resulting in “[…] modifying the 
ideological distance separating the relevant parties, or by encouraging the emergence of 
wholly new European-centred dimensions of competition” (2000: 30). Hence, we assume 
that Europeanisation is taking place if we can observe changes in party positions and an 
increasing divergence of pro- and anti-European positions.  
In order to establish whether changes in party positions have taken place we looked at the 
percentage of sentences parties expressed positively towards the European level in their 
manifestos, subtracting the percentage of sentences that had a negative connotation. The 
difference gives us the position a party has on the European issue.  
Looking at our three cases, we find results which mostly underline our initial assumptions. 
Whereas in Finland parties show hardly any negative positions towards European 
integration, in Austria and Sweden parties are much more distinct in their European positions 
with, on the one hand, Euro-sceptic parties and, on the other hand, quite Euro-friendly ones. 
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In detail, we can observe for Austria in Figure 1 that in 1996 two Euro-sceptic parties 
characterised the political landscape. The Greens and the FPÖ held quite negative positions 
towards the EU. On the other side of the scale, the major parties – SPÖ and ÖVP – had 
clear positive EU-stances, as well as the LIF. 
In 1999, the FPÖ moved even further to the anti-European side, whereas the Greens clearly 
moved on the positive side of the scale, hence featuring the biggest changes between 1996 
and 1999 in the Austrian political landscape (see Figure 2). Four years of EU-membership 
made the Greens change their minds about the impact of European integration, now clearly 
being in favour of it. Also the other parties have slightly different positions than three years 
ago. The SPÖ and ÖVP became a little bit less enthusiastic about the European integration 
process even though they still feature very clear positive positions. However, the Austrian 
example shows first, that parties do change EU positions and second, that parties have 
distinct positions towards the EU. Hence, the EU is a dimension parties do disagree upon. 
Hence, this can be regarded as an indication that European integration has an impact on 
parties and is not taken as a secondary issue.6  
In Sweden the situation is similar to the Austrian one, as Figure 3 shows. We can find Euro-
sceptic as well as Euro-friendly parties: The Greens and the VP feature negative positions, 
while the other five parties from Social Democrats to Centre Party can be characterised as 
pro-European parties. However, it is necessary to point out a few differences to the Austrian 
parties. While in Austria the Social Democrats have quite strong positive attitudes towards 
the EU, the Swedish SAP is much more reluctant in expressing overly positive positions. In 
general, this conclusion can also be made for the other Swedish parties.7
Unlike in Austria where parties’ pro-EU positions decreased, parties in Sweden became 
more enthusiastic about European integration in the course of time, as we can observe from 
the more pro-European attitudes across the parties on the positive scale (see Figure 4). It 
seems as if Swedish parties started out much more sceptically at the beginning of EU-
membership and turned, only after the first experiences with the EU, into EU-supporters. As 
in Austria, the Swedish Greens also moved away from their strong anti-European position 
(from -17.5 to -6.14) even though they still remain negative towards European integration. 
Unlike the Swedish and the Austrian parties, Finnish parties do not differ much regarding 
their European positions looking at Figure 5. Especially in 1996 there is not a single party 
that can be named ‘Euro-sceptical’ contradicting the common belief that the VIHR, the VAS 
and the KESK have anti-European stances. All of them feature positive European positions. 
                                                     
6  These changes might also be due to the contextual factors such as the ‘adaptation’ to EU-membership.  
7  See for example the KD or the MSP. 
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The two major parties SDP (21.67) and KOK (21.99) are clearly in favour of European 
integration.8
The situation does not change in 1999, as Figure 6 reveals. All parties represented in 1996 
remained positively oriented towards the EU. Almost all of these parties – with the exception 
of the KOK – became much more Euro-enthusiastic than in 1996. The KESK and the 
RKP/SFP might represent the most outstanding examples: the KESK’s positions changed 
from 7.87 in 1996 to 23.96 in 1999, the RKP/SFP’s one from 16.2 to 31.86. 
Nevertheless, we find in the 1999-scale a party which is negatively oriented towards the EU: 
the KD. The party was not represented in 1996 whereas we cannot make any comparison 
with this party. However, compared to the anti-EU parties of Austria and Sweden, the 
negative EU-position of this party is quite modest. 
Figure 1: Austrian EU Positions 1996
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Figure 2: Austrian EU Positions 1999
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8  Hitherto, parties’ EU positions have been measured based on experts’ estimates. In our analysis we have 
used manifesto data to gather EU positions. These two different measures might explain the divergent results.  
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Figure 4: Swedish EU Positions 1999
VP MPG
KD
SAP CP FP MSP
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
 
Figure 5: Finish EU Positions 1996
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What we can gather from this first analysis is that parties do change their EU-positions – 
some of them quite substantially. Parties take the European issue seriously and try to find 
their positions. Based on our definition of Europeanisation moving positions is an indication 
that parties care about the European issue, find it worthwhile to engage in it and try to adopt 
positions that reflect their ‘true’ stances towards Europe also to differentiate themselves from 
the other competitors. Static and stable positions reflect that the European issue is not 
regarded as important as an issue that they would need to reflect upon and adapt it. 
Especially in states which joined the EU only recently a dynamic process can be expected if 
Europeanisation is taking place. These new states only have to learn to deal with European 
institutions, the implementation of EU-legislation and the transfer of competences to the 
European level, which should lead to a dynamic process in the positions of parties towards 
the EU.9
We have conducted a further analysis to understand whether parties behave distinctively or 
rather cohesively at the European dimension and hence, whether Europeanisation as such is 
taking place. In order to do so, we have calculated standard deviations for the different issue 
categories (see Appendix). Standard deviations are regarded as a measure to calculate the 
cohesiveness of parties regarding particular positions. Small scores indicate cohesive party 
                                                     
9  The ‘socialisation process to Europe’ works in both ways. Parties can either become more negative or more 
positive towards the European integration process.  
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positions on particular issues, high scores reveal divisions amongst parties (Schmitt and 
Thomassen, 1999; Pennings, 2002).   
We have calculated cohesiveness in two ways: the first one within each country in order to 
grasp how cohesive the particular party systems are, the second one within the single parties 
across time. Hence, we monitored whether parties remain stable in their EU-positions or 
whether a fluctuation could be observed. In the following, we will go into more detail.  
Looking at party positions in Table 1, we can observe that the single party systems do differ 
substantially from each other. Especially when looking at the first two categories referring to 
the general positive and negative positions towards the EU, we can state that parties do not 
behave cohesively over the European issue. For Austria, it is remarkable to point out that 
parties have very distinct positions on the negative aspects of the EU. For Finland, the 
opposite is the case. There, parties have quite common anti-EU positions but diverge 
substantially on their pro-EU positions. In Sweden, both positions are characterised as being 
quite distinct. The results obtained reflect the divergent EU-positions we could observe 
earlier on. While Finish parties are very moderate in their negative notion of the EU, Swedish 
and Austrian parties have much more different views on the negative implications of 
European integration. The situation is quite similar for 1995/96 and 1999. 
Table 1: European policy space and the variance of European policy positions 
(standard deviations): All political parties per country per election year 
 Austria Finland Sweden 
Issue Category 1996 1999 1996 1999 1995 1999 
EU positive 7.7 7.0 8.7 12.6 5.5 9.9 
EU negative 12.8 12.7 3.8 2.0 9.9 8.1 
EU Institution positive 3.7 4.4 1.9 2.0 1.3 2.3 
EU Institution negative 1.3 2.3 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.9 
EU Democracy positive 1.9 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.1 2.1 
EU Democracy negative 0.6 0.8 0.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 
EU Policy positive 5.3 3.7 5.7 4.2 7.2 7.3 
EU Policy negative 4.5 1.9 3.3 1.0 5.9 2.9 
EU Competence pos. 4.9 4.5 3.2 4.7 3.1 1.6 
EU Competence neg. 7.5 4.1 1.8 1.8 5.7 5.7 
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Let us have a look at the other EU-positions. It is interesting to note that parties have 
cohesive positions on the EU-institutions regardless of whether they are negative or positive. 
Also, parties behave cohesively regarding EU-democracy. This is, however, not valid for EU-
policies. Parties have distinct positions on EU-policies as well as on EU competences. Once 
again, Finland shows the highest cohesiveness in the negative categories due to the fact 
that Euro-sceptical parties are not present in the Finish party system. 
Secondly, we analysed whether parties maintained cohesive positions towards the EU or 
whether they changed their positions between the two elections (see Table 2). We can 
observe the biggest changes between 1995/96 and 1999 in Austria. There, parties changed 
their EU-positions quite substantially. The Greens, who moved from a Euro-sceptical to a 
Euro-friendly party, hence show one of the highest scores, as well as the FPÖ, which moved 
even more to the anti-EU side. But the other parties also feature quite high scores in the EU-
positive and EU-negative categories, hence showing that the EU issue is still a very dynamic 
issue where parties have not yet found their exact position. 
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Table 2: European policy space and the variance of European policy positions (standard deviations): each political party over years 
(1995/96 – 1999) 
Issue Category Austria Finland Sweden 
 GR SPÖ FPÖ LIF ÖVP VIHR VAS SDP KD KOK KESK RKP MPG VP SAP FP KD MSP CP 
EU positive 6.3 2.2 7.5 2.3 2.6 1.2 2.4 3.5 - 8.3 6.2 9.1 1.1 3.3 1.6 0.7 0.5 9.7 4.4 
EU negative 5.7 5.0 5.2 4.4 1.9 3.2 4.9 1.2 - 3.9 5.0 2.0 6.6 1.3 1.8 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.5 
EU Institution pos. 2.6 6.7 7.4 3.7 0.4 1.4 0.4 4.6 - 0.7 1.8 3.5 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.1 0.1 5.0 0.4 
EU Institution neg. 1.5 4.7 3.7 2.4 2.7 0.6 0.3 1.3 - 0.7 1.5 0.4 3.1 1.8 0.3 0.2 3.5 0.2 0.2 
EU Demo pos. 3.0 1.8 3.8 1.5 0.4 4.1 5.5 4.9 - 2.1 5.9 0.4 2.1 2.5 3.7 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.2 
EU Demo neg. 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.0 2.0 0.5 0.0 - 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 
EU Policy pos. 0.8 0.8 5.7 4.5 1.7 5.5 1.2 2.0 - 1.8 3.3 1.6 2.2 4.4 0.6 2.3 4.1 2.6 4.8 
EU Policy neg. 3.2 2.4 3.4 1.1 0.5 3.8 3.9 2.4 - 2.4 7.1 2.2 8.3 2.5 2.8 0.3 0.8 1.7 0.5 
EU Comp. pos. 1.4 1.5 1.4 2.9 0.2 1.9 1.7 5.8 - 2.7 1.1 4.7 2.8 3.6 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.4 1.3 
EU Comp. neg. 3.1 0.2 4.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.4 0.0 - 1.9 1.0 0.6 3.1 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.7 
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The situation presents itself differently in Finland and Sweden, with a few exceptions. Party 
positions remain more stable over time. The exceptions in Finland are KESK and RKP who 
became much more Euro-friendly and KOK who showed more anti-European statements in 
1999 than in 1996. The picture is similar in Sweden: quite cohesive party positions over time, 
with the exceptions of MSP and MPG who both became more Euro-friendly in 1999. Hence, 
apart from Austrian parties, parties seem to behave quite cohesively, hence softening the 
earlier argument on the Europeanisation process for some of the Swedish and Finish parties. 
Finally, let us have a look at the other categories. Regarding EU-institutions and EU-
democracy parties show cohesive positions – apart from the exceptions mentioned earlier.  
Once again the highest scores can be observed for EU-policies. Parties do not possess 
cohesive positions when it comes to evaluate them positively or negatively in their 
manifestos. This might be due to the fact that new members do not yet know the course of 
action in the EU and the implication of EU-policies on the national level well. A re-positioning 
is therefore necessary and inevitable. Surprisingly, parties show cohesive positions on EU-
competences. It seems as if once a party has opted to be in favour of EU-competences – or 
vice versa – this is hardly going to be moved. 
To sum up, we can state that the European issue is a dimension parties indeed disagree 
upon – especially in Austria and Sweden. We take these as hints that parties compete over 
the European issue, as parties refine their positions trying to distinguish themselves clearly 
from each other. Moreover, for Austrian, some Swedish and Finnish parties we can observe 
that parties do not remain static actors when it comes to the European issue. Rather, parties 
do change their positions quite a bit over time, reflecting experiences made with and at the 
European level. Hence, we can argue that for those cases a Europeanisation process in 
terms of changes in party positions is clearly taking place, while for the others only a partial 
Europeanisation process could be detected.   
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5. Voters’ Positions 
After having analysed Europeanisation in terms of salience and position change, we would 
like to analyse whether the distinctiveness between parties is also followed, or rather, 
desired by the voters. We will have a look at whether parties represent their voters when 
holding certain EU-positions, assuming that this would indicate that a Europeanisation 
process is ‘awarded’ by their voters. 
For it, we have analysed Eurobarometer-surveys in 1996 and 1999. We have observed 
which voters hold which opinion about EU-membership. The results are illustrated in graphs 
7 to 12. In 1996, for Austria we can state that voters’ and parties positions correspond: Green 
voters as well as FPÖ-voters see very few positive things in EU-membership. For the other 
parties, voters are more balanced: around 35 % of SPÖ and ÖVP-voters evaluate EU-
membership as positive, but the other 35 % regard it as negative. Voter and party positions 
accord in Finland also, with the exception of the VIHR whose voters are much more critical 
than the party. In Sweden, it is remarkable that most voters – with the exception of MSP and 
FP voters – do not have any preference on EU-membership. But otherwise, in Sweden party 
and voters positions are also concordant: VP and MPG-voters being negative, voters of the 
other parties being more positive. The question arises as to whether such a high 
correspondence between voters and parties could be expected (e.g. Warwick, 2004; Merrill 
et al., 2001) or whether these high scores are due to the short membership with voters 
constrained by parties’ EU-positions, as no individual experience is available. Looking at the 
1999 results we will shed light on this.  
Graph 7: Voters’ Position on EU Membership 1996 – Austria 
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Graph 8: Voters’ Position on EU Membership 1996 - Finland 
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Graph 9: Voters’ Position on EU Membership 1995 - Sweden 
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Graph 10: Voters’ Position on EU Membership 1999 - Austria 
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Graph 11: Voters’ Position on EU Membership 1999 - Finland 
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Graph 12: Voters’ Position on EU Membership 1999 – Sweden 
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In 1999 (Graphs 10 to 12), we observe for Austria that Green-voters are much more positive 
than the party. The same argument works for FPÖ-voters who have less negative attitudes 
towards the EU than the party. In addition, ÖVP-voters are less enthusiastic about the EU 
and much more critical towards it. In Finland also, the discrepancy between voters and 
parties is growing. For instance, VIHR-voters regard EU-membership very positively while 
the party can be characterised as rather sceptical. The same works for KESK: voters are 
sceptical towards the EU, however the party holds a very pro-European position. In Sweden 
the situation is the reverse of that of 1996. While in 1996 a majority of voters did not have 
any opinion regarding EU-membership, in 1999 this had changed substantially: voters had 
clear opinions and they corresponded with the parties’ EU positions.  
This leads us to the following conclusions. A Europeanisation of the voters has not yet taken 
place, as they do not punish their parties for not following their European positions nor do 
they follow the position of their party. Moreover, we can conclude that the general 
distinctiveness of parties on the EU-issues has not yet been recognised by their voters. The 
need for a new cleavage line along the European dimension is hence not given.10  
                                                     
10  In addition, these results raise the question what this means for the ‘democratic’ representation in the EP. If in 
EP-elections citizens vote for parties on grounds other than European, the EP’s activities might suffer rightly 
from a democratic legitimation problem.  
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6. Party Europeanisation: Reflecting on Party Cleavages? 
Changes could have crucial effects on the further development of a European political space 
and the role of parties within. Changes would be especially crucial if Europeanisation 
develops into a new cleavage line of party positioning. Cleavages are defined as a “[…] 
distinction of opinion along social indicators running consistently through all kinds of policy 
issues” (Gallagher et al., 2001: 235). The origin of such distinction can be religious, ethnic, 
occupational or of other social meaning. The groups involved must recognise themselves 
and act as a collective identity, and they must be represented in their cleavage structure by 
an organisational entity, such as a union or a party (Gallagher et al., 2001). Voters vote along 
these cleavage lines – in particular, along the Left-Right divide (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; 
Gallagher et al., 2001; Laver and Budge, 1992; Hix and Lord, 1997). This means that party 
systems are structured accordingly.11 Whenever one or in consequence all of the 
requirements mentioned above for a cleavage change, cleavage structures and thus party 
systems could change as well (Gallagher et al., 2001). Due to the character of cleavages, 
the European factor could therefore have an impact on cleavage structures. If the salience of 
Europe is high in states, and the range of EU positions is wide, the potential for party 
competition over Europe is high as well.  
Hence, we pick up the widely discussed question in the literature (e.g. Hooghe et al., 2002; 
Gabel and Hix, 2002; Mair, 2000; Hix and Lord, 1997; Steenbergen et al., 2004) of whether 
parties’ EU-positions can be classified according to the Left-Right scheme or whether – as 
Mair puts it – new fissures can be observed within parties due to the European issue (Mair, 
2002: 27) – especially after having detected Europeanisation in terms of salience and party 
position change. Connected with this question is whether the European issue has caused a 
new dimension parties can compete about. While the former arguments stress a 
concordance between the Left-Right position and the EU-position, hence, arguing that the 
Left-Right dimension ‘integrates’ the EU-dimension and thus, competition over the EU 
follows the Left-Right divide and a linear relationship can be observed, the latter argument 
includes the understanding that the European and the Left-Right dimension are independent 
of each other, resulting in a new faction parties can compete within.  
Two diverging stances have become prominent within this latter argument. The first one 
argues that EU-positions and Left-Right-positions are completely distinct dimensions where 
the Left-Right dimension and the European one are orthogonal to each other (Hix and Lord, 
1997), the second one stresses that the two dimensions are related ones (Hooghe and 
Marks, 1999) where the Left-Right dimension works only for a part of European issues 
                                                     
11 The most influential cleavage line in Western Europe is the left-right divide. 
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related to redistribution and regulating capitalism, as well as neoliberal economic policies. 
Next to these two stances, the ‘new politics’ dimension has lately become important in 
explaining variations in positions of parties towards Europe. New politics is roughly what 
Hooghe et al. (2002) mean with their category ‘GAL’. They argue that instead of the Left-
Right dimension it is rather the traditional/authoritarian/nationalism (TAN) versus the 
Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) dimension that explain parties’ EU-positions. Parties on 
the TAN-side feature a rather Euro-sceptical view, while the GAL-pole is moving towards 
more positive EU-positions. We will analyse which model works best for parties in Austria, 
Finland and Sweden. 
We have plotted the EU-dimension versus the Left-Right dimension. We have taken the Left-
Right values from the expert survey conducted by Steenbergen et al. (2004). From Graphs 
13 and 14, we can observe that EU-positions in general seem to be characterised by the 
Left-Right cleavage. We can notice that parties on the left have more Euro-sceptical 
positions than parties on the right. The exception includes the FPÖ which at the extreme 
right shows very negative EU-stances.   
Graph 13: Left-Right Dimension versus EU-Dimension 1995/96 
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Graph 14: Left-Right Dimension versus EU-Dimension 1999 
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According to these graphs, we can argue that the GAL-TAN model does not work for 
Sweden and Finland. Parties from the right, such as MSP and KOK, show pro-European 
positions. Rather, European positions can be explained by the Left-Right dimension: the 
more we move to the right, the more parties become pro-European. We take these results as 
an indication that a cleavage based on European factors per se has not yet arisen. Europe 
as an important factor in party competition is not yet available. Rather, European positions 
seem to be influenced by the Left-Right position of the individual parties. Even though party 
positions changed indeed, and salience in Europe increased, a Europeanisation in terms of 
independence of the European issue from the traditional Left-Right scheme cannot be 
observed. 
However, for Austria the GAL-TAN model seems to work. The Greens are moving towards a 
Europe-friendly position, while the FPÖ moves further into EU-negative stances. Hence, the 
new politics dimension GAL-TAN seems to have penetrated the traditional Left-Right one 
rendering the European factor an important one. Austria, experiencing high European 
salience as well as a wide range in party positions, shows potential for party competition 
over Europe.  
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Conclusions 
We asked whether Europe changes national parties. We defined such a development as the 
Europeanisation of national parties, expressed in terms of an increasing salience of the issue 
of Europe and the change of party positions towards Europe. We adopted a definition of 
Europeanisation as a process of reorientation (Ladrech 1994), and operationalised it in terms 
of the development of Eurofriendly and Eurosceptic positions in national party systems, 
combined with an increased salience of the issue Europe. Hence, we focused on three 
issues of analysis: the assessment of a change in the salience of the EU-issue, the 
examination of a change of party positions, and a potential impact of such a change on 
cleavage lines in the analysed countries.   
With a limitation to the 1995 EU newcomers Austria, Finland and Sweden, we used a set of 
different empirical data. We analysed salience and party position change on the basis of data 
from Euro-manifestos of parties released for the EP-elections in 1995/96 and 1999, and we 
used Eurobarometer data in order to relate our findings to voters’ positions. The use of 
different data sets has to be kept in mind when looking at our results.  
We expected to find Europeanisation in the analysed three states in terms of increased 
salience, party position changes, and an impact of the issue Europe on cleavage lines. We 
can overall conclude that the salience of the issue Europe has indeed increased in all three 
states. Unlike the expectations of Andeweg (1995) and Mair (2000), who estimate national 
positions to be predominant, Europe is indeed an important factor in the Euro-manifestos. 
Euro-sceptic positions also do not exclusively focus on the national level but focus, for a 
number of parties, on European-level criticism. 
Substantial party position changes, however, could only be observed in Sweden and Austria. 
Positions changed over time, and they were very distinct. We could pinpoint changes in the 
disagreement of parties over the issue of Europe, and the importance of Europe for the 
competition between parties.  
The assessment of an impact on cleavage lines enabled a certain deduction of 
interpretations for our findings on salience and party position change. As for the role of 
Europe for cleavage structures, the Left-Right divide was reinforced by the issue of Europe 
in Sweden and in Finland. In Austria, the GAL/TAN divide introduced by Hooghe et al. (2002) 
could be identified as the cleavage line along which parties position their EU standpoints. 
Along our definition, the Europeanisation process in the member states that entered the EU 
in 1995 has therefore progressed most strongly in Austria. These findings are also confirmed 
by our look at voters’ preferences. Voters’ preferences and party positions on the issue 
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Europe lacked a sufficiently high match to qualify as a cleavage line represented by parties. 
Overall, parties’ positions on Europe run along the cleavage lines of GAL-TAN or Left-Right, 
but the issue of Europe does not generate a new cleavage. However, it could be an 
important factor in explaining why parties move from one cleavage line to another in their 
positions, as was the case for Austria. Hence, Europe appears to have an influence on 
national party positions, which is already identifiable after the four years of membership we 
analysed. 
Overall, we have confirmed theoretical approaches and assumptions held in the literature, 
especially those of Jahn and Widfeldt on the revitalisation of the Left-Right dimension in 
Sweden and Finland, those of Hooghe et al. (2002) on the importance of the GAL-TAN 
divide in Austria and more generally, on the increasing importance of the issue of Europe in 
national party positions. However, our data goes beyond mere confirmation: our findings 
refine theoretically developed arguments. Especially important is the fact that in our three 
selected cases, the issue of Europe plays an important role in the allegedly second-order 
EP-elections. Accordingly, national parties at least deal increasingly with the issue Europe in 
EP elections, and they appear to not only interpret these elections as a pretest for national 
elections, but as a clearly European event, for which they produce positions on European 
politics. The importance of Europe is hence perhaps stronger than generally anticipated. Our 
data was limited to three countries and to party manifestos of two elections as well as to 
Euro-manifestos only. Future research will therefore have to shed more light on this, but the 
presented findings can be used as good indicators.  
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Appendix 
Coding Frame 
EU-Institutions - Positive EU-Institutions - Negative 
2-305 Political Authority 2-303 Executive and administrative efficiency
2-306 Competences of EP 2-307 Competences of EP 
2-308 Competences of European 
Commission 
2-309 Competences of European 
Commission 
2-310 Competences of Council 2-311 Competences of Council 
2-312 Competences of Court of Justice 2-313 Competences of Court of Justice 
2-314 Competences of Other EU-Institution 2-315 Competences of Other EU-Institution 
2-3141 European Central Bank 2-3151 European Central Bank 
  
EU-Democracy - Positive EU-Democracy - Negative 
2-202 Democracy in Europe  2-2021 Lack of Democracy in Europe 
2-203 Constitutionalism in Europe 2-204 Constitutionalism in Europe 
2-3111 Majority Voting in the Council  2-3101 Unanimity in the Council 
  
EU-Policy - Positive EU-Policy - Negative 
2-104 Military in Europe 2-105 Military in Europe 
2-2011 Freedom  2-4085 Single Market 
2-2012 Human Rights 2-4087 European Monetary Union  
2-4041 EU Structural Funds 2-6011 Immigration 
2-4084 Single Market 2-6021 European Way of Life 
2-4086 European Monetary Union  2-608 Multiculturism 
2-607 Multiculturism 2-7032 Agriculture and Farmers 
2-7031 Agriculture and Farmers  
  
EU-Competences - Positive EU-Competences - Negative 
1-108 EU versus nation state 1-110 EU versus nation state 
2-108 Deepening of Europe 2-110 No deepening of Europe 
3-108 EU versus global dimension 3-110 EU versus global dimension 
2-302 Centralization  2-301 Decentralization 
2-3021 Transfer of Competences 2-3011 No transfer of competences 
 2-318 Complexity of the EU Political System 
 x-413 Nationalization  
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